Dramatic news reports, claims and videos have emerged from both sides involved in the fighting in Gaza over the past week.

The week began with the Israeli army releasing several videos of Palestinians stripped down to their underwear marching through urban ruins. Israel’s PR machine ignored the Palestinian outcry that followed. Israel firmly insisted that the men were Hamas fighters and that their alleged mass surrenders meant the end of the Palestinian group was near, while many Palestinians and independent observers insisted that the men were civilians those who violated martial law were publicly humiliated.

Hamas, for its part, stuck to its usual practice of advancing its cause through video releases – cleverly edited to enhance the desired effects – and purported to confirm its consistent and numerous successes against Israeli invaders, mostly showing hits against armored vehicles.

Then came the news that stunned Israel and called into question its official position that Hamas was on the verge of collapse. First, nine soldiers were killed in a single operation in the Shujaiya district of Gaza City on Tuesday. This shock was followed by another on Friday when the Israeli army admitted this killed three Israeli prisonersbecause they had considered them enemies – even though they carried white flags.

So what is really happening on the ground in Gaza?

Nothing we didn’t foresee weeks ago: the war has entered a difficult, unpredictable and bloody phase of large-scale urban warfare, where gains are small and slow and losses can be enormous.

Fighting in narrow and narrow streets of ancient cities is considered one of the most difficult ways to wage war. Classic military theory calls for defended cities to be surrounded and blockaded by units just strong enough to prevent the defenders from breaking out, while the main force continues to advance and capture territory.

But the fight in Gaza is not about conquering fields and beaches – Israel’s stated goal is the destruction of Hamas. To achieve this, the first step is to control the ground on which the enemy operates: the cities.

Many aspects of the art of war are as old as the human urge to wage war: to attack and conquer or to defend and remain free. But the way to achieve these goals has changed with technology, and at certain times the means available to soldiers favor one aspect over another.

Cities used to need strong walls to defend themselves, but over the last 100 years weapons have evolved rapidly, leading to a change in tactics. Successful resistance to enemy attacks no longer depends on huge, expensive static bastions. Nowadays, such as anti-tank rocket launchers, grenade launchers, small mortars, assault rifles and many others allow defenders to transform every house and street into small but powerful portable weapons whose destructive power is disproportionate to their size.

From the 1940s to the present, almost all attempts to capture cities held by determined defenders have failed. The few victories the attackers won were so costly that they often nullified the offensive capabilities of the armies advancing into the cities.

In their own way, StalingradWarsaw, Berlin, Dien Bien Phu, Vukovar, Sarajevo, Grozny and Fallujah – some successfully defended, others eventually falling victim to attack – all confirmed the military wisdom that urban wars should be avoided whenever possible.

Israel could not avoid urban war in Gaza. To have a chance of destroying Hamas, it must deny it its area of ​​operations, the three largest urban centers in the Strip: Gaza City, Khan Younis and Rafah.

In the first phase of its ground operation, the Israeli army advanced over open terrain, farmland and villages that were not suitable for mounting major defenses, but only carried out harassing attacks to slow and contain the invaders. Hamas acted in classic guerrilla fashion, launching several hit-and-run attacks without wasting any effort to stop the Israelis immediately.

The second phase began with Israeli forces reaching first the suburbs of Gaza City and then, after the temporary ceasefire expired, Khan Younis. Anticipating a concentrated response from Hamas, the Israeli military moved slowly and carefully and completed the encirclement of these two urban areas.

It would be naive to assume that Israeli generals hoped that by isolating Gaza’s two largest built-up areas they would seriously impair the state’s ability to function Distribute brigadesthe armed wing of Hamas to fight back.

In reality, the encirclement of the two city centers is not a classic case in which the troops within the blockade cannot be reinforced or supplied. Hamas still has an unknown but likely large portion of its tunnel network intact and can move in and out. They have some difficulties, but Hamas fighters are not locked up.

Israel is aware of the threat posed by tunnels, but also aware of the great danger that comes with taking the fight into them, and has therefore tried different approaches. It has destroyed as many tunnel entrances as it has found, mostly in the areas it controls, but many others that remain ensure the danger is acute.

After several attempts to send troops underground that ended in disaster and the troops fell victim to Hamas’ booby traps, the high command abandoned this approach. The idea was then reportedly considered Filling tunnels with seawaterIt claims that the test flooding was successful, but has not yet decided to carry out a large-scale flooding operation.

Israeli actions on the ground this week strongly suggest that the Israeli army leadership recognizes that the only way to achieve its stated goal of destroying Hamas is to gain ground in the currently surrounded centers of Gaza City and Khan Younis to capture, hold and control.

That alone would not guarantee victory, but it could create conditions to force Hamas fighters into tunnels, whereupon Israeli forces could block and destroy all entrances.

To drive out Hamas would likely require weeks of heavy urban warfare with many more massive casualties – on both sides.

The more Israeli soldiers are killed in the inner cities of Gaza without being able to claim the destruction of Hamas, the more support for continuing the military operation would weaken. At some point, Israel’s calls to end the war may become louder than calls to continue the war.